Using Manifold Embedding for Automatic Threat Detection: An Alternative Machine Learning Approach by Piroddi, Roberta et al.
PIRODDI, ET AL. : MANIFOLD EMBEDDING FOR AUTOMATIC THREAT DETECTION 1
Using Manifold Embedding for Automatic
Threat Detection: An Alternative Machine
Learning Approach
Roberta Piroddi1
R.Piroddi@liverpool.ac.uk
Elias Griffith1
E.Griffith@liverpool.ac.uk
Yannis Goulermas2
J.Y.Goulermas@liverpool.ac.uk
Simon Maskell1
S.Maskell@liverpool.ac.uk
Jason Ralph1
Jfralph@liverpool.ac.uk
1 Department of Electrical Engineering
and Electronics
EEE Building A,
Brownlow Hill,
University of Liverpool
Liverpool, UK
2 Department of Computer Science
Ashton Building,
The Quadrangle,
University of Liverpool,
Liverpool, UK
Abstract
This paper presents an approach to automatic threat detection in X-ray imagery based
on the combination of manifold embedding and a specialized classification strategy to
identify a wide range of firearm threats in imagery captured in operational settings and
in challenging simulated settings which closely reflected operational conditions. The
results show that this approach is successful in reducing the amount of data needed to
produce a flexible classification system by two orders of magnitude if compared to most
state-of-the-art deep learning systems used for object recognition. The work also of-
fers useful indications to the amount of data required for such an alternative machine
learning approach. It also shows an enhanced algorithmic architecture for the fusion of
very different classifiers, so that a generic and flexible system may be adapted to varied
operational environments.
1 Introduction
In recent years machine learning, especially in the embodiment of deep learning, has been
responsible for great feats of automation in tasks that previously had been considered only in
the realm of human processing capabilities [18]. The object recognition task on unstructured
and large image data-sets has been the most successfully devolved to machine analysis, in
terms of volume, speed and accuracy of the recognition [14, 31].
It is therefore sensible to apply a machine-learning approach to the task of firearm threat
detection and recognition in security screening [13, 20]. The application of automation,
let alone machine learning, to such security applications, is particularly challenging [12, 13].
Effective systems need to cope with the operational needs of detecting both full weapons and
c© 2019. The copyright of this document resides with its authors.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Training phase of our MOPE-SVN system (b) Analysis phase where a scanned
image is assigned one of two labels.
components, in environments that span from the security screening of travellers luggage, to
the border checks of goods transported in pallets and containers. X-ray sensors in use for
security screening applications vary substantially in the characteristics of the imagery that
they are able to provide as a function of the environment where they are deployed [7, 28],
settings decided by single operators, and colour depth [6, 21]. In contrast to those employed
in successful machine learning, data-sets available to train security screening applications
are typically unbalanced: the vast majority of examples are of benign images, with few
examples of images containing threats [1]. Finally, the system performance accuracy that
may deemed to be acceptable for such sensitive applications needs to be extremely high and
not just when considering the detection of threats, but also with regards to the excessive
presence of false positive alerts that may severely dent the trust of the operator in the system,
in an environment characterized by high time pressure [5].
Most other studies on automated threat detection for security screening which consider
specific subsets of challenges [22], for example the development of a classifier for a spe-
cific class of threats [1, 4, 25] in a restricted [15, 16, 19] and very controlled environment
[11, 27, 28]. These works show that for deep learning to be highly effective in this ap-
plication it requires a number of examples of target object that is unusual to obtain. The
method developed here therefore considers an alternative machine learning approach, which
is able to learn from fewer examples to deliver a flexible and accurate system with realistic
quantities of target imagery. This approach uses manifold embedding [29] to discover the
most distinctive sets of features to describe a target object and it combines it with a special-
ized classification strategy to maximize the potentiality of the embedding technique to distill
salient information. Although manifold embedding is well-known mainly for dimensional-
ity reduction, we applied it as a saliency detector using a technique, MOPE, that has been
shown to generalize well from small data-sets [23]. Around this core concept (see Figure 1),
this approach builds a full system and processing pipeline for concrete, real or realistic and
extremely challenging operational boundaries of use.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the architecture of a system to
answer the requirements of adaptability and flexibility of target and environment. Section 3
describes the experimental set-up we used to train and test the system. Section 4 provides
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Figure 2: (a) Object hierarchy for the category with the label of threat. (b) Example of style
of objects for a particular type of threat and the concept of binary classifier developed to
detect each style.
the performance characteristics of the proposed system. Wider implications of this work are
discussed in Section 5. Conclusions follow in Section 6.
2 Method
This machine learning multiple-stage architecture has the ultimate goal to recognize between
two possible states of the sensed world: one state is for a given X-ray image to contain a
firearm (or part of it) and the second state is for a given image to contain only benign objects
[9].
The system will therefore be composed of two main subsystems to train the classifier
and then to apply it to analyze an image, see Figure 1. In an operational setting, when a new
image is input into the system, according to the learned classification rules, it gives the new
image a label, either benign or threat [3]. The characteristics of the system depend on the
machine learning approach and the classification strategy used.
2.1 Machine learning analytic core
The core classifier is a Support Vector Machine (SVM) [9], which requires a choice of
features [10, 30]. Manifold embedding, irrespective of features employed, would help to
sift salient information [10, 26], especially considering different poses of the same object
[24, 32]. Multi-Output Proximity Embedding (MOPE) [23] has shown to generalize well
from a relatively small sample of training exemplars [8]. In the recognition system pro-
posed, see Figure 1, MOPE sits at the interface between the feature extraction and classifi-
cation. The input to the classifier is an embedded set of features that are well separated into
clusters corresponding to the two possible states. A linear kernel for the SVM is sufficient to
find an efficient classification rule, shown diagrammatically in the inset of Figure 1.
In the testing or analysis phase, which is when this system is operationally used, an im-
age never seen by the system is presented in input. The new image is classified either as
an acceptable (benign) or an anomalous (threat) state. A simplified view of the operational
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Figure 3: Analysis pipeline employed to apply one classifier to a test image.
system is shown in Figure 1.(b). To ensure that the capability of embedding for saliency
extraction is maximized, the classification engine is coupled with a single classifier devel-
opment strategy where highly specialized binary classifiers are developed for specific styles
of threats, as shown in Figure 2.(b). This strategy hinges on having a hierarchy of objects to
detect, as shown in Figure 2.(a).
2.2 Analysis pipeline
The system’s unit of analysis is a processing pipeline that uses a single classifier (as shown
in Figure 2.(b)) and applies it to analyze a test image, as in Figure 3.
Pre-processing is performed using color (some X-ray scanners provide dual color im-
agery, where the color depends on the energy band), where possible, and intensity informa-
tion. With color imagery, highly informative colour signature can be associated to potential
threats. The core analysis module extracts Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) [2, 9] features
on square patches of the image, obtaining 4096 features for each window around a pixel
selected for processing. They are then transformed using the MOPE to 2. Each pixel is
classified according to its embedded feature values using a linear SVM.
Post-processing is performed on the basis of the color signature of contiguous areas of
pixels classified as threat. Using the statistics of the size of threats relative sensor resolution,
it is possible to further exclude segments.
A single classifier is specific to the environment, because the type of clutter and benign
objects are different in luggage item, a pallet or a container [7, 30], so this pipeline needs to
be employed for each environment with its specific single binary classifiers.
2.3 Classifier bank and fusion
In this approach, the categories of benign and threat are summaries of specific categories of
threats (as in Figure 2.(a)). Classifier fusion is required to get to the final distinction between
threat and benign. The classifiers are resolution specific, so each classifier for each type of
firearm in each environment has an associated resolution. The multi-resolution part of the
processing retrieves the information about the link between classifier and resolution.
The system employs Bayesian average classifier fusion [17]. The probability associated
to each label is based on color segmentation, considering the overlap between segments
which present suspicious characteristics and those classified as threats. Where the sensor is
a grey-level sensor, intensity is used instead. The fusion pipeline is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Whole processing pipeline to test multiple classifiers on one candidate test image.
Each environment needs its own analysis tool with classifier banks developed to find
threats and components in the clutter, and sensor resolution characteristics, that are associ-
ated to the imaged environment.
Figure 4 shows how the processing components are connected together to support the
need to cater for different threats and sensing environment. At input, the program settings
indicate the environment and the kind of sensor (e.g. resolution as a function of environ-
ment and colour intensity characteristics). If it is applicable, the dual colour component is
split from the intensity and processed to extract and classify colour regions. A set of multi-
resolution versions of the input images are generated and presented as input to embedding
modules. This is required because the embedding and following classifiers are resolution
dependent and to classify different styles of threats and components, each of the specialized
classifiers is linked to a specific resolution of the image in a given environment. Each clas-
sifier outputs a binary image containing bounding boxes of areas of the image of potential
threat. The multiple binary masks, relative to different resolutions and threat types, are col-
lected and re-sized to a common resolution. There may be bounding boxes that overlap and
in order to provide a clear label, the bounding boxes are given as inputs to a fusion engine.
This engine uses the colour signatures and links them to the areas classified as potential
threat. This provides a probability estimation of a region contained in a bounding box being
a certain threat. The probabilities are fused together using Bayesian averaging so that the
label with the highest probability is output with a colour coded overlay showing a bounding
box relative to the label with the highest probability.
3 Experimental set-up
The UK Home Office provided the X-ray data-set as part of a funding competition to sup-
port automatic threat detection research. Experiments covered three different environments:
luggage, as baggage (airport hand baggage type of environment) and fast parcels (hold-type
baggage), and pallets and containers. The sensors characteristics, the image resolution and
the image quality as well as clutter were different for each kind of environment [21]. For
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Figure 5: Performance comparison between the strategy of training a classifier on a generic
object type (in this case a pistol) and training a classifier specialized on a particular style of
the object.
each environment, the task was to detect full firearms and components.
Training. Each classifier was trained using 104 training samples, of these 70% were of
non-target examples (negatives or benign). To build positive (threat) examples, reference
images of the full threats were superimposed to background clutter samples where available.
Reference images of components were unavailable in general. Where references were un-
available, the testing set was split and a subset was used segmented to use for training. For
full-weapons in luggage the data-set consisted of 5×105 operational benign images and tens
of reference images for around 10 firearm types in 52 out-of-plane 3D poses, taken with
consistent and high resolution dual color airport scanners. For pallets and containers, refer-
ence images were not available. Container sensors provided grey-level imagery. The data-set
contained around 80 benign images for pallets and 7 for containers.
Testing. The experimental plan covered separately the three different environments, with
classifiers trained for full firearms for the three environment. Weapon component classifiers
were developed for the luggage environment only. It was impossible to develop component
classifiers for the larger environments, because of (a) the low resolution of the images making
the components too small to be processed and (b) the contrast characteristics of the imagery
which meant that the layers of clutter were able to obscure the smallest components. The
experimental plan also contained several tasks, each one related to finding a particular kind of
threat (full, component). Full threats are subdivided into: small sizes (subdivided into styles),
medium sizes, and large sizes. The component classifiers were: barrel, bolt, trigger, trigger
assembly and spring. The experiments considered also the evaluation of the classification
strategy that designs numerous specialized classifiers.
4 Results
The first set of experimental results concern the evaluation of the classification strategy em-
ployed to maximize the potential of the embedding technique to abstract from the feature
selection and still extract the more distinctive information from a set of features, as pre-
sented in Section 2.1. The performance of this strategy compared to the use of a generalized
classifier that is trained on a general category of firearm is presented in Figure 5. It is pos-
sible to increase the accuracy of the classification in terms of both true and false positives,
sometimes seemingly with some trade off between false and true positives.
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Figure 6: Classification results for a choice of labels between threat and benign for the three
environments of luggage, pallet and container and for classifiers trained on full objects.
(a) (b)
Figure 7: (a) MOPE-SVM performance after partial fusion distinguishing between 4 labels
(3 threats and 1 benign) and (b) CNN performance trained on the same labels and and tested
on the same data sub-set.
The performance of the combined classification between threat and benign, after process-
ing described in Section 2.3 when all filters trained on full weapons are considered is shown
in Figure 6. The classification is not meaningful for pallets and containers, possibly because
of insufficient number and variability of benign images. The lack of reference images from
sensors specific to such environments may have also played a role.
For the luggage environment, Figure 7.(a) shows the performance of the system in detect-
ing specific types of full weapon: large weapons (e.g. assault rifles), medium sized weapons
(e.g. sub-machine guns), and small weapons (e.g. pistols). It was possible to train a Con-
volutional Neural Network (CNN) using some limited transfer learning on the same labels
and then test it on a set of very well-behaved test images. The CNN performance is given in
7.(b), as reference point to a theoretical best-case scenario.
Classifiers trained to recognize components were only evaluated in the luggage environ-
ment, with two kinds of experiments. The first was using test images with known compo-
nents. The performance is shown in Figure 8.(a).
A second kind of experiment was performed on images containing full weapons or be-
nign images. This experiment allowed investigating: (a) whether classifiers that were devel-
oped to find components may find parts of full objects, and (b) how many benign objects
were classified as possible weapon parts. The results of this experiment are reported in Fig-
ure 8.(b).
The classifier for the barrel seemed to include features that made it the most recognizable
part. Parts as spring even though they did look recognizable, contained so many frequencies
in the coils and different variations and non-rigid transformations that were not easily en-
capsulated in only one non-invariant classifier. The approach to develop classifiers from
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Figure 8: Confusion matrix for (a) a set of 5 categories of threat components for which a
classifier has been built in the luggage environment and (b) for component classifiers tested
on full weapons and benign images.
cut-out of images (as the trigger) did not work, because this approach used global and not
part-models. For this reason, the trigger assembly, a part with similar shape and size to a full
threat achieved good results on full threat images, while the trigger did not.
Finally, to give an idea of the intermediate and final outputs and the quality of the results
obtained using the full analysis pipeline, in Figure 9 shows the processing steps that led to
the final classification label for a few sample images.
5 Discussion
Classification performance is linked to the amount and the quality of examples in the training
phase. The ability of the training data-set to cover a large part of the space of possible
variations of operational scenarios is crucial to all machine learning methods. The classifiers
evaluated in this project have been trained using 10,000 samples. Experiments have shown
that for each 1,000 extra samples there was on average an accuracy increase of 0.25%. Deep
learning systems are trained using millions of samples. Achieving such a large number of
images in this project was difficult, with very few examples of background clutter in pallets
or containers, and few or absent reference images of threats.
The performance characteristics show that it is possible to increase the accuracy of the
classification by employing very specialized classifiers. This approach requires to have refer-
ence images to support the specialization in terms of object styles. It also requires increased
sophistication in terms of the algorithmic architecture that supports the classifier fusion. This
also has implications in the computational complexity.
The approach here proposed is successful in terms of true positives identified, with per-
formance comparable on this metric with deep learning, using two orders of magnitude fewer
samples for the training. Still the MOPE-SVM approach requires sufficient numbers of be-
nign examples and reference examples of threats generated by sensors that are environment
specific. For the environments, like pallets and containers, where such reference images
and fewer benign examples were available, the performance showed that it is challenging to
transfer characteristics and statistical signatures from one sensor and environment to another
space. This is particularly important in case of transfer from colour to grey-level sensors.
This is line with the finding of previous studies [6, 7, 10].
Further research is needed to establish the optimal balance of parameters in terms of
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pistol
Original image Detected foreground Potential threat
Input to embedding Regions of interest Output of post-processing
barrel
Original image Detected foreground Potential threat
Input to embedding Regions of interest Output of post-processing
sub-machine gun
Original image Detected foreground Potential threat
Input to embedding Regions of interest Output of post-processing
Figure 9: Intermediate analysis results of MOPE-SVM analysis pipeline in images of lug-
gage environment.
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samples and specialization required to support an operationally useful result. This is espe-
cially the case for firearm component detection. Another area where research is needed is
that of the link between classification performance and sensor characteristics, in order to find
the optimal method to tune the two. This is likely to be a fast moving area as new types of
sensing technology emerge.
6 Conclusions
This paper presented a multistage analysis and classification system to perform automatic
threat detection in variable security screening environments. The system contained specific
algorithms to deal flexibly with multiple categories of threats and multiple screening en-
vironments ranging from hand-held luggage at airports to container in good transportation
scenarios. The analysis of the performance characteristics of the proposed approach showed
that combining an embedding method that selected discriminative information with a clas-
sification strategy that maximized the opportunity to locate salient information was a viable
method to apply machine learning for threat detection when the quantity of data was small.
This approach used roughly two orders of magnitude less training data than deep learning
and achieved accuracy comparable to state-of-the-art Convolutional Neural Networks for
true positives. The results also confirmed that, like expressed elsewhere in the literature [22],
feature transfer from one sensor to another was challenging. Therefore systems needed to
be developed for specific environments. More research is required to develop efficient meth-
ods tailored to deployment environments. As of state-of-the-art X-ray sensors for screening,
more research is needed to establish the parameters that render classification systems more
effective for each environment specificity and presentation.
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